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Abstract ‘‘The idea of nature’’ (general model of how things work) that is accepted in a
society strongly influences that group’s social and technological progress. Currently, sci-
ence education concentrates on analysis of stable pre-existing items to minimum con-
stituents. This emphasis is consistent with an outlook that has been widely accepted since
the late Renaissance—that characteristics of individuals depend exclusively on the prop-
erties of their microscopic components. Much of 19th and 20th century science seems
compatible with that now-traditional outlook. But major parts of contemporary science
(and fundamental technological problems) deal with open-system dynamic coherences that
display novel and important characteristics. These important entities are not adequately
treated by the presently-dominant idea of nature. In contrast, the notion of how the world
works that contemporary science and current technological practice generate emphasizes
synthesis and self-organization of far-from-equilibrium ‘‘dissipative structures.’’ Arguably,
eventual success in meeting the severe technological and social challenges occasioned by
increasing world population will require general diffusion and appreciation of that newer
overall outlook. Chemistry educators have been important in developing and disseminating
the earlier worldview—they can and should provide leadership for widespread adoption of
the alternative idea of nature.
1 Introduction
Human populations remained quite low from the origin of Homo sapiens more than one
hundred thousand years ago until the invention and spread of agriculture less than ten
thousand years ago. About five centuries BC, world-population growth became somewhat
faster, and it accelerated again about one thousand years ago. Clearly the present rate of
population-increase cannot long continue: several alternative future scenarios can be
envisioned. Some thoughtful people fear bloody internecine conflict (such as controlled
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pre-historic populations), others recommend colonization of extraterrestrial habitats or
advocate other and less-complex technological measures in order to deal with future
population-pressure.
Each prior major change in world-population growth-rate has been preceded by sig-
nificant change in a generally-accepted ‘‘idea of nature’’—the concept of how the world
works that is dominant in a society. This paper suggests that, in order for needed tech-
nological development to be effectively achieved, the currently-accepted idea of nature (an
atomistic outlook adopted in the Renaissance) needs to be replaced (or supplemented) by a
different worldview—one that emphasizes spontaneous self-organization of dynamic open-
system coherences. Chemical educators have been centrally important in the general
adoption of the current worldview: chemical education needs to develop so as to facilitate
the conceptual shift that our situation requires.
2 Outlook Influences Results
Recent archaeological investigations—both in Turkey (Cauvin 2000) and in Mexico
(Marcus and Flannery 2004)—have studied the remains of ancient communities that
spanned the transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural technologies. In both of these
cases, the investigators concluded that specific developments in conceptual systems pre-
ceded—and made possible—technological transitions on which subsequent population-
increase depended. Similar situations occurred thousands of years later in ‘‘The Axial
Age’’ (Arnason et al. 2005) when several widely-separated civilizations independently
developed novel, rather self-consistent, conceptual systems which facilitated higher rates
of population-growth. Yet another such conceptual transition occurred in Western Europe
before, during, and after the Renaissance. In that well-documented cultural shift, an earlier
generally-accepted idea of nature (a complex combination of concepts that had originated
in the Axial Age) was largely but not completely replaced by the notion that nature is a
mechanism that runs by the remorseless working of law-determined motions of simple
components. As Fig. 1 shows, this conceptual change was followed by a major increase in
the rate of world-population growth.
Science educators often mention that the recent increase of world population depended
on the rapid development of large-scale industry—which in turn was caused by origin of
modern science. Perhaps surprisingly, recent efforts by historians to demonstrate direct
connections between the 17th century origin of modern science and the subsequent
increase in industrial activity have not been successful. It has turned out that the inno-
vations that accounted for the rise and spread of industry in the 18th and early 19th
centuries were largely made by cut-and-try methods that had pre-scientific origins and did
not depend on scientific understanding (McCloskey 2010). Gradual technical developments
during the late Middle Ages, sometimes called ‘‘The Second Agricultural Revolution’’
(Thompson 1968), had greatly increased the availability of food before the often-discussed
rise of modern science and the Industrial Revolution. On this basis, some have argued that
the great flowering of human productive activity during the past three hundred years should
be credited, in large part, to changes in general outlook, worldview, or weltanschauung
rather than directly to science itself. ‘‘What really had changed was that innovation gave
people the outlook and the intellectual and material tools to search for their own new ways
of working’’ (Goldstone 2009). That is to say, the necessary preconditions for the Industrial
Revolution and the development of science were provided by a shift in ideas—a major
change in the general opinion of the dignity of the motives, behaviors, and habits that
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characterize life in progressive cities—as contrasted to the values prized by aristocratic,
theocentric, or militaristic cultures. In the late Medieval and early Renaissance periods,
social controls shifted so as to allow (or even to favor) innovations aimed at changes in the
ordinary patterns of life. This ‘‘sociological’’ shift fostered creativity in both administrative
and technical matters.1 Rather than being related as a chain of causes, the Second Agri-
cultural Revolution, the rise of modern science, and the Industrial Revolution may well
have initially been more or less independent developments—and only subsequently
merged to produce jointly-influenced outcomes.
3 Renaissance Cosmology
A book (Greenblatt 2012) that won the highly-prestigious Pulitzer Prize for general non-
fiction describes how widespread study of an ancient epic-length poem, De Rerum Natura
(On the Nature of Things) by Titus Lucretius Carus (95–51 BC), played a major role in
facilitating the transition of worldviews that occurred during the late Renaissance. That
Latin work, which was based on ideas of an Axial-Age Greek philosopher (Epicurus, c.
341–270 BCE) had been lost for many centuries until a single copy was located in 1417 in
a monastery library. The main point of that work was that nothing exists apart from
‘‘bodies’’ and ‘‘the void’’ and therefore many widely-accepted beliefs (especially religious
ones) are delusions. Even though De Rerum Natura challenged highly-valued traditional
beliefs, that work was widely (if cautiously) discussed among educated people from its
Fig. 1 The growth of world
population. Redrawn after Fogel
(2010). Data from
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/
worldhis.html
1 ‘‘And a century before Defoe [ca. 1660–1731], the English were beginning to learn from the Dutch the
improving spirit of active, striving, laborious men such as will put their hand to the plow, try experiments,
and give all their attention to what they are about.’’ This transition was also accompanied by a change in
rhetoric: ‘‘It is a methodical and accounting rhetoric, tied to practical hope and courage, and foreign to the
bold gestures in court and battlefield of an aristocratic society’’ (McCloskey 2010, pp. 367–368).
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re-discovery until the recent decline of classical education. Widespread circulation of this
work during the 15th and 16th centuries raised issues that Richard Dawkins and other
‘‘New Atheists’’ have brought up again recently.
Long before the ‘‘Chemical Revolution’’ of the 18th and 19th centuries—in which
chemists discovered firm evidence supporting chemical atomism—European natural phi-
losophers and scientists (prominently including Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle) generally
accepted the Epicurean doctrine (advocated by Lucretius) that all things were made up of
minute and rapidly-moving ‘‘corpuscles.’’ Although Boyle, Newton, and others rejected
Lucretius’s conclusions with respect to religion, his epic poem deeply influenced their way
of thinking. Isaac Newton’s famously successful late 17th century treatment of the motions
of bodies—even including the long-debated movements of the moon and planets—con-
sidered ‘‘matter’’ as self-sustaining stuff, resistant to change in motion to an extent pro-
portional to its mass but otherwise inert—so that all motion was impressed on bodies by
external sources of agency.
As a presumed corollary of the Renaissance understanding of how nature works, many
philosophers now hold that properties of composite objects depend only (‘‘supervene’’) on
properties of components—that is the properties of the items at the most-microscopic
structural level determine all properties (e.g., Armstrong 2010, p. 29 ff.). The doctrine that
adequate knowledge of the microscopic components of things (and how they relate to each
other) provides a sure basis for understanding nature had strong support from much of the
science of the 20th century.
• During the first half of the century, quantum–mechanical interpretation of the electronic
structure of atoms—and the description of isotopes in terms of nuclear protons and
neutrons—supported the belief that everything was composed of only a few types of particles.
• At about the same time, ‘‘the synthetic theory’’ rather successfully integrated Mendelian
genetics and population biology with Darwin’s model of biological evolution.
• In the second half of the 20th century, ‘‘the central dogma of molecular biology’’
rationalized Mendelian genetics in molecular terms.
Correspondingly, one of the main ‘‘take-home lessons’’ of introductory chemistry
instruction came to be that nothing exists apart from atoms of the chemical elements.
Chemical educators (at many levels) have served as an effective sales-force convincing
contemporary people that ‘‘actuality is incurably atomic’’ (Whitehead 1978, p. 61).
Whitehead also pointed out that, for more than three centuries: ‘‘… the cosmology
derived from science has been asserting itself at the expense of older points of view with
their origins elsewhere.’’ But he continued: ‘‘Men can be provincial in time, as well as in
place. We may ask ourselves whether the scientific mentality of the modern world in the
immediate past is not a successful example of such provincial limitation’’ (Whitehead
1967, p. vii). Historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood predicted (1945) a still-further
shift in worldview would soon occur: Whitehead and this paper endorse that prediction.
Arguably, dealing with technological and social problems that twenty-first century soci-
eties face will require that an alternative outlook be widely adopted (Gare 2010).
4 Contemporary Science
The main thrust of current science differs in important ways from what was envisioned by
previous models of science. A few varied examples may suggest some areas of contem-
porary investigation that lie outside the range of applicability of the Lucretian model.
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• Entities believed to be ‘‘elementary’’ in specific earlier periods repeatedly have been
found to be composite by subsequent research.
• Recently-discovered self-organized dynamic astronomical structures have immense
spatial and temporal extension.
• Macro-molecular and supra-molecular materials are now of central importance in both
science and technology (Newth and Finnigan 2006).
• There is good evidence that life originated in evolutionary transitions in (proto-
metabolic) cyclical networks of chemical reactions operating in open systems (Smith
and Morowitz 2004).
• Patterns of persistent biological behavior turn out to be ‘‘multiply realizable’’—several
diverse underlying arrangements generate the same higher-level structure.
• Studies of evolutionary development (‘‘Evo-Devo’’) show that complex multi-level
interactions control and regulate the actions of genes (Carroll 2006).
• The ways in which organisms live and reproduce influence their genetic structure as
much as genetic structure influences individual organisms.
• Psychology and neuroscience now go well beyond ‘‘reductive’’ models (e.g., Bennett
and Hacker 2003; Bolender 2010; Donald 2001).
• In economics, recognition is spreading that more-inclusive entities must function well
in order for action of self-interested economic individuals to be effective (Bowles and
Gintis 2011).
• Sociologists now recognize that religions (broadly understood) are main mechanisms
that motivate and organize cooperative pro-social human action. Counterintuitive (i.e.,
incredible) features may be transmission-enhancing advantages, rather than fatal flaws,
in religious systems (Atran and Heinrich 2010).
• The social function of religious practices is only loosely connected to formal doctrines:
religions have played indispensable parts in human evolution and will quite probably
continue, albeit with evolutionary changes (Atran 2010).
5 Beyond the Renaissance Worldview
The usual philosophic assumption that properties of composite objects depend only
(‘‘supervene’’) on the properties of their components is often not correct (Mellor 2006).
Generally, principles that apply to the components are necessary but not sufficient to deal
with the behavior of complicated systems (Kauffman 1993, 1995; Mitchell 2009).
Obtaining adequate scientific understanding of important problems requires attention to
several ‘‘levels’’ of organization—characteristics of the most-miniscule components only
partially determine behaviors of macroscopic systems. Regularities considered by ‘‘fun-
damental’’ microphysics are necessary to account for macroscopic coherences, but they are
not sufficient (Bishop and Atmanspacher 2006). A myriad of detailed configurations would
be consistent with any given composition of an isolated mechanical system. The history of
the relevant context (Earley 2012) determines which of the many possible configurations of
each specific real system is the one that actually exists. There is no single ‘‘fundamental’’
level of description that is adequate for all scientific discourse.
In the late nineteenth century French physicist Henri Poincare´ (1854–1912) studied the
details of the motion of the several planets that make up our solar system. He encountered
situations for which the methods of Newtonian physical mechanics were ineffective due to
the occurrence of ‘‘resonances’’—more or less long-lived associations of otherwise
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independently-moving bodies. When such correlations developed, previously well-tested
equations gave incorrect results: computed quantities increased without limit at specific
parameter-values (‘‘singularities’’). Poincare´ was able to deal with this difficulty by
approximating some variables by divergent series (using ‘‘asymptotic expansions’’). This
technique (Berry 1994; Batterman 2002, 2009) generally led to discontinuous changes of
the equations that described the systems. Familiar equations in terms of easily recognized
system-components applied on one side of the singularity, but equations with quite dif-
ferent structures (and often involving variables not obviously directly related to the
components from which the system had been assembled) were valid on the other side of the
singularity. Those alternative expressions were relatively simple, emphasized important
features, and suppressed details that were not relevant. Beyond a singularity, information
about the detailed properties of the components of the original problem was no longer
important in the description of the system. This approximation achieved success in
describing a composite system—but at the cost of wiping out the significance of the
detailed natures of the components.
Sciences other than ‘‘fundamental physics’’ can and do discover significant natural
regularities. Usually, cooperative action of lower-level entities renders lower-level details
inconsequential for the purposes of each ‘‘special science.’’ This result is the basis on
which every developed science treats some entities as quasi-elementary (‘‘honorary sim-
ples’’) for the purposes of that science—even though another science may treat the same
items as composites. This situation is well described by Hans Primas (1998): ‘‘The task of
higher level theory is not to approximate the fundamental theory but to represent new
patterns of reality.’’ Robert Laughlin (1998 Nobel Laureate in Physics) writes:
Over time, careful quantitative study of microscopic parts has revealed that at the primitive level at
least, collective principles of organization are not just a quaint side-show but everything—the true
source of physical law, including perhaps the most fundamental laws we know. ….[N]ature is now
revealed to an enormous tower of truths, each descending from its parent, and then transcending that
parent as the scale of measurement increases. Like Columbus or Marco Polo, we set out to explore a
new country but instead discovered a new world. (Laughlin 2005, p. 208).
Approaches that are based on the assumption of independently-acting components may
well be useful in dealing with relatively simple systems studied in elementary courses, but
quite different outlooks are required for more complex cases—especially for self-
organizing open-system dynamic coherences.
6 Open-System Dynamic Coherences
One of the main growth-areas of twenty-first century science is investigation of how pro-
cesses combine to yield more-or-less stable persistent integrations—self-organizing dynamic
coherences that return to prior patterns of organization after disturbance. In such systems,
networks of processes (collections of chemical reactions, sets of interactions of quarks and
gluons, combinations of actions of biological organisms, assemblies of economic transac-
tions …) fit together to produce more or less persistent dynamic non-equilibrium steady
states, sometimes (if rather inelegantly) called ‘‘quasi-equilibriums.’’ Such systems some-
times change rapidly and drastically without obvious cause. This and other aspects of the
behavior of systems built up from inter-connected processes are highly counter-intuitive—
that is, they fall outside the range of ordinary experience. Recent progress on the ways that
processes of change combine has brought major parts of the behavior of such ‘‘non-linear
dynamic systems’’ within the range of possible scientific understanding. Major aspects of the
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world—such as biological and cultural evolution—can now be at least partially understood
on the basis of recently-achieved insights into how self-organized far-from-equilibrium
coherences behave. However, rather different modes of reasoning are needed for these sys-
tems than for less-complex problems (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 2010).
Ordinary chemical substances are characterized by equilibrium arrangements of ele-
mental centers (‘‘atoms’’): vibrations and rotations around those reference arrangements
continually occur. Each system returns to its equilibrium arrangement after a disturbance.
Self-restoring capability is the defining characteristic of ‘‘structure:’’ such arrangements are
called ‘‘equilibrium structures.’’ We now recognize that many entities formerly thought to
be substantial and enduring are actually resultants of networks of processes. When nature
involves what seems to be a persistently-constant concentration of some chemical species,
close examination usually leads to recognition that the concentration is maintained near its
average value by some sort of network of interconnected reactions, generally an oscillatory
one. Rather than actually persisting without change, concentrations usually alternately
increase and decrease in such a way that the average concentration-value is more-or-less
constant over time—and the system tends to return to that pattern of oscillation after any
modest disturbance (Shinar and Feinberg 2010). Such dynamic structures differ in
important ways from equilibrium structures. Ordinary solids, liquids, and gases (all of them
are equilibrium structures) can persist indefinitely in closed systems, fully isolated from
their environment. In contrast, all persistent, dynamic, oscillatory, coherences continually
consume higher-energy, lower-entropy materials and generate lower-energy, higher-
entropy products. These coherences are designated as ‘‘dissipative structures.’’ (Kondepudi
and Prigogine 1998). Such dynamic entities require interaction with their environment in
order to persist—they must exist in ‘‘open systems.’’ If reactants continuously enter and
products leave, then a system may function (oscillate) for an indefinitely long time:
otherwise, oscillations will eventually cease. Spontaneous formation of such far-from-
equilibrium objects occurs because of the reactive propensities of the components.
Although the environment continually supplies high-energy reactants and receives low-
energy products, in an important sense these coherences are self-organized.
What sort of relationships might give rise to a collection of several dynamic components
behaving coherently—the collection functioning as a unit? Closures of relationships—
effectively ‘‘unit-determining properties’’ (Armstrong 2004)—can occur in dynamic systems
at many levels, from that studied by quantum mechanics to that of interest to international
economics or astronomical cosmology. Intense study of such coherences dominates much of
contemporary physics, biology, and social science. Networks of chemical processes provide
typical and accessible examples of such behavior. Chemists—particularly Belgian physical
chemist, Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003, Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1997)—made major contri-
butions to our understanding of this type of coherent organization (Prigogine and Stengers
1997; Epstein and Pojman 1998; Kondepudi and Prigogine 1998).
Each chemical dissipative structure involves a reaction (or set of reactions) that gets
faster as it goes on—an ‘‘autocatalytic’’ process (The simplest example would be:
A ? B ? 2 B, where B is ‘‘an autocatalyst.’’). Systems that involve such reactions tend to
be unstable—they readily disperse, explode, or settle into a single state. However, if such a
system also involves one or more processes that suitably reduce the concentration of the
autocatalyst (such as B ? C ? D) then the system may return to its original condition, and
even do so repeatedly, thereby generating continuing oscillations—a kind of long-term
persistence (Earley 2003).
In each dynamic coherence, closure of the network of reactions that define the structure
causes the effects of the coherence on other items to be quite different from effects of the
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same components but without that closure. The structure as a whole makes a difference:
therefore, that coherence must be counted as one of the items that comprise the world (Ney
2009; Earley 2006)—the structure as a whole has ontological significance. The effects of
the structure are the sums of the effects of the components, but which components persist in
the system depends on the details of the closure of the network of reactions. The network of
relationships regulates the composition of the system. For example, the existence of bio-
logical dissipative structures accounts for the production (and therefore the existence) of
high-energy molecular forms such as sugars, proteins, and DNAs: but those molecules are
themselves components of the dissipative structures that produce them. Components are
influenced by the characteristics of the coherences which those same components consti-
tute. Lucretius deviated from his master Epicurus in postulating that bodies sometimes
swerve (in what he called a clinamen) away from their normal straight-line motions and
thereby (in some way or other) produce macroscopic objects—but he did not consider how
this might work out in practice. It has turned out that fluctuations that generate closure of
networks of relationship are essential for all persistent coherences.
Dissipative structures exemplify the situation described in 1932 by Otto Neurath
(1882–1945): ‘‘We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able
to dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials’’ (Neurath
1959, p. 201; see also Cartwright et al. 1996). Reactant molecules and ions that comprise a
dissipative structure at a given time are not the same individuals that make up the
coherence at a later time—but the coherence maintains itself during the change of com-
ponents (as Neurath’s boat must stay afloat while it is being reconstructed). The particular
propane and dioxygen molecules that fuel a steady gas-jet flame at one instant are not the
same molecules that fuel the same flame later: when a tsunami moves across an ocean (at
several hundred miles per hour) specific samples of sea water move up and down as the
wave (which they comprise) moves over them—but those samples do not travel far in the
direction in which the wave so rapidly moves.
Although Lucretius and modern chemical educators have been correct in asserting
nothing exists apart from microscopic components, it is not correct to claim that nothing
exists other than those components. Whenever coherences display non-redundant causal-
ity—when they have effects over and above those of their uncoordinated components—
significant ontological emergence has occurred (Earley 2006).
7 The New Idea of Nature
The view of science that dominated the twentieth century emphasized analysis: it sug-
gested that the ultimate sub-microscopic constituents of nature are what is finally impor-
tant, when all is said and done. The science of the 21st century embodies a quite a different
view—one that emphasizes creative synthesis—combining and modifying pre-existing
items to produce new and useful coherences (Earley 2008). The new approach does not
deny the effectiveness and usefulness of analytic methods—rather it builds on those
techniques and then moves beyond them. Creativity is now more important than compo-
sition: ‘‘The problem of evolution is the development of enduring harmonies of enduring
shapes of value, which merge into higher attainments of things beyond themselves’’
(Whitehead 1967, p. 94). Integration and coherence can occur at many levels, and existing
coherences can fail to function at each of them. Disintegration at a lower level can bring
about rupture of high-level coherence—but failure of higher-level integrations can destroy
1782 J. E. Earley Sr.
123
Author's personal copy
conditions that are necessary for persistence of lower-level integration. Persistence and
adequacy of function at any level depend on maintenance of integrations at several levels.
Rapid development of chemistry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries depended on
prior description of the behavior of ores, minerals, and other materials—clarification of
‘‘natural history.’’ During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries human knowledge of
natural history expanded greatly. We now understand that the lighter chemical elements
came into being in stars such as our Sun—after protons that had been produced by the
initial singularity and subsequent expansion (‘‘the big bang’’) joined together (‘‘fused’’) to
produce helium, carbon, and other light elements. In such stars gravitational compression is
balanced by expansive tendencies due to energy released in the fusion processes—so that
long-lived dynamic coherences are produced. Heavier elements result from cataclysmic
changes which dynamic stellar systems undergo as they deplete their fuel supplies. Such
natural synthetic processes should receive as much (or more) emphasis in elementary
chemical instruction as the analytical achievements on which our understanding happens to
be historically based (Earley 2004).
The basis of our current scientific worldview—‘‘the evolutionary epic’’—is a story of
repeated functioning of nested and interconnected dissipative structures including many
chemical reaction-networks (Mason 1991; Chaisson 2006). The basic principle that self-
organization of dissipative structures increases the rate of entropy-generation (compared
to otherwise similar situations without dynamic coherence) underlies any understanding of
the general characteristics of evolution (Schneider and Sagan 2005). Explicit focus on
closure of networks of processes in far-from-equilibrium systems is important—and will be
even more significant in the future. Chemical educators should explicitly cover the evo-
lutionary origins of the chemical coherences they deal with—and consider nonlinear
dynamic systems (and models) in their courses. Even though most undergraduate students
rather easily learn to use appropriate software packages, they encounter real conceptual
problems with dynamic-system modeling (Earley 1996). The ‘‘idea of nature’’ needed to
deal with nonlinear dynamic systems is not the same as the worldview that largely dom-
inated the twentieth century.
Achievements of science under the former banner provide a necessary basis of the
newer approach—and the precision of language emphasized by positivistic philosophers
(Matthews 2004) must be maintained. The prior approach—now deeply built into ‘com-
mon sense’ (Kincheloe and Tobin 2009)—should not be disparaged, but rather treated ‘a
special case’ for which simplifying assumptions apply. But that now-traditional approach
must be extended and reinterpreted by effective educational innovation (e.g., Bryce 2010).
8 Shifting the Focus
The pattern shown in Fig. 1 is quite characteristic of autocatalytic processes. In order for
human population to long survive, processes balancing that rapid population-increase must
increase in effectiveness. Hopefully, this will occur quite soon and by mechanisms other
than the violent conflict among human groups that mainly accounted for low growth-rates
for pre-historic human populations.
For the past two centuries humans have exploited fossil fuels to obtain cheap energy—
taking first coal and then petroleum from below Earth’s surface and turning those materials
into water and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. That easy situation cannot long con-
tinue—both because of limitations on resources and due to deleterious effects of emissions.
Ongoing rapid growth of human population (and also rapid increase of per-capita
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disposable income) makes it clear that presently-known technologies providing for human
subsistence are unsustainable. Since much low-hanging technological fruit has already
been harvested, innovations that are explicitly science-related must become even more
important in the future than they have been in the past. Previously, many ordinary
industrial workers did well with little understanding either of science or of the intricacies of
human culture. In the future, people will need stronger and wider educational back-
grounds—both as workers and as civic decision-makers. Before petroleum reserves are
depleted—sometime during the present century—efficient catalytic systems based on
robust and cheap inorganic materials must be developed for artificial photosynthesis and
for chemical feed-stock generation.2 Research on artificial photosynthesis spanning several
decades suggests that such developments may be possible, but that achieving such progress
will require long-term, high-level scientific and engineering work on a large scale (Gray
2009).
Paradoxically, the notion that composites can be understood solely in terms of the their
minimum components has inspired large-scale highly-cooperative state-sponsored projects
such as the ten-billion-dollar Large Hadron Collider, operated by the European Organi-
zation for Nuclear Research (CERN) with long-term funding by 20 European nations.3 In
July, 2012 CERN announced ‘‘strong indications for the presence of a new particle, which
could be the Higgs boson’’—the particle thought to be responsible for the mass of other
particles. Technologies necessary for future long-term human flourishing will also require
massive technical efforts and large-scale government funding. Populations will need to
reduce consumption to support research on complex interrelationships of multilevel open-
system coherences. On what basis could effective arguments to support such long-term
sacrifice of individual benefit be made? Surely, general understanding of the multi-level
structure of things is a prerequisite—but widespread appreciation of how the creative
dynamism of nature functions through nonlinear dynamic coherences will also be essential.
New concepts of how the world works must be built into the common-sense of future
generations in order to justify needed science-related expenditures. Chemistry educators
can and should make major contributions to this highly-important shift in the popular idea
of nature. Perhaps some future general-chemistry students will move on to emulate
Lucretius—and to spread the new idea of nature through outstandingly-creative artistic
work.4
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